---
tag: Q0JSW6W3R7
kind: statement
role: proposition
name: Russell's paradox 1902
sources:
  - wikipedia: en:36595472@r1359939615
    locator: History of the function concept, section Development of the set-theoretic definition > Russell's paradox 1902
    note: adopted
    mention: wikipedia://en/36595472#ANDB
    sections: [Statement]
inventory: [EK9DA5P8SH]
---

## Statement

In 1902 Russell sent a letter to Frege pointing out that Frege's 1879 *Begriffsschrift* allowed a function to be an argument of itself: "On the other hand, it may also be that the argument is determinate and the function indeterminate . . .." From this unconstrained situation Russell was able to form a paradox:

"You state ... that a function, too, can act as the indeterminate element. This I formerly believed, but now this view seems doubtful to me because of the following contradiction. Let *w* be the predicate: to be a predicate that cannot be predicated of itself. Can *w* be predicated of itself?"

Frege responded promptly that "Your discovery of the contradiction caused me the greatest surprise and, I would almost say, consternation, since it has shaken the basis on which I intended to build arithmetic".

From this point forward development of the foundations of mathematics became an exercise in how to dodge "Russell's paradox", framed as it was in "the bare \[set-theoretic\] notions of set and element".