Philosophical consequences of Gödel's completeness theorem
Statement
Gödel's completeness theorem establishes an equivalence in first-order logic between the formal provability of a formula and its truth in all possible models. Precisely, for any consistent first-order theory it gives an "explicit construction" of a model described by the theory; this model will be countable if the language of the theory is countable. However this "explicit construction" is not algorithmic. It is based on an iterative process of completion of the theory, where each step of the iteration consists in adding a formula to the axioms if it keeps the theory consistent; but this consistency question is only semi-decidable (an algorithm is available to find any contradiction but if there is none this consistency fact can remain unprovable).
Further reading
- Wikipedia, page 169358, revision 1375962285, Foundations of mathematics, section Foundational crisis > Philosophical views > Philosophical consequences of Gödel's completeness theorem. adopted
About this page
| Tag | DP717VX73G |
|---|---|
| URI | m2://DP717VX73G |
| Kind | statement, theorem |
| Writing | W0 stub |
| Status | This copy of the site has no build data. Run m2 status DP717VX73G. |
| Changed | 4 November 2026 |
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