Mathematical logic and foundations Philosophical questions and foundational programs Problem
Hilbert's program
Builds on FormalismPeano axioms
Problem
Write all of classical mathematics as a formal system with finitely describable axioms and rules of inference. Then prove, by finitary means only, that this formal system is consistent. Here a proof is finitary when it reasons only about finite strings of symbols in a concrete, checkable way. Consistency means that no formula is derivable together with its negation .
Remarks
The program is the main form of formalism. It also asked for a proof of completeness: every statement of the system should be provable or refutable. Gödel's incompleteness theorems of 1931 showed that the program cannot be carried out as first intended. A consistent, effectively axiomatized system that contains enough arithmetic is incomplete. Such a system also cannot prove its own consistency. In 1936 Gerhard Gentzen proved the consistency of the Peano axioms of first-order arithmetic, see Gentzen's consistency proof. His proof uses transfinite induction up to the ordinal , which goes beyond the finitary means of the original program. Partial versions of the program are studied in proof theory and in reverse mathematics.
Reading path
To understand this page from the ground up, read these 3 pages in order. The foundations come first.
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- Formalism concept
- Peano axioms concept
- Hilbert's program problem
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About this page
| Tag | P1RW6JWX73 |
|---|---|
| URI | m2://P1RW6JWX73 |
| Kind | problem |
| Writing | W0 stub |
| MSC | 03A05, 03F25, 03F30 |
| Status | This copy of the site has no build data. Run m2 status P1RW6JWX73. |
| About | Foundations of mathematics |
| Uses | Formalism, Peano axioms |
| Same as | |
| Changed | 2 November 2026 |
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